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Bringing Sexy Back: Unauthorized
Film Editing, Copyright, and
How Removing Reproductive Acts
Violates Reproduction Rights
Logan Clare∗
INTRODUCTION
In the late 1990s,1 Ray Lines, along with his wife Sharon,
endeavored to mine a previously untapped market by creating
clean, edited versions of major Hollywood films and turning them
into E-Films.2 The process was simple: take a hit film, delete
objectionable and indecent content, including bad language,
nudity, and graphic violence so that conservative audiences could
enjoy mainstream entertainment free of salacious situations.3 The
∗
J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2008; J.D. Candidate, Fordham
University School of Law, 2008; B.A. Art History, Barnard College, 2003. I would like
to thank Professor Joel Reidenberg for his inspiration and advice, and the members of the
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal for their help in
completing this Comment. I would also like to thank Mike for every single thing, and my
parents for all their love and support.
1
See Andrew Gumbel, Censored in the Name of the Lord, INDEP. (London), Sept. 21,
2005.
2
See Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1238 (D. Colo.
2006). Mr. Lines has stated: “I enjoy movies but I got tired of sitting in theaters saying,
if only they had left that one scene out.” Kieth Merrill, Cleaning Up the Movies (pt. 1),
MERIDIAN MAG., http://www.meridianmagazine.com/arts/020604clean.html (last visited
Jan. 27, 2007). E-films are simply “cleaned up versions of box-office hits.” Rick Lyman,
Hollywood Balks at High-Tech Sanitizers; Some Video Customers Want Tamer Films,
and Entrepreneurs Rush to Comply, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2002, at E1.
3
The first foray into this business was the creation of a sanitized version of TITANIC
for Lines’ Mormon neighbors. Gumbel, supra note 1.
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idea was a popular one, and a number of businesses began to offer
similar products.4 The Lines themselves profited by launching
CleanFlicks,5 a franchised chain of video rental stores that
exclusively offered E-Films.6
Robert Huntsman, an attorney who owned several CleanFlicks
stores in Colorado and Idaho,7 was so certain that producing and
selling these E-Films fell within the limits of the law that he sought
a declaratory judgment holding that the creation and sale of EFilms did not constitute a violation of the exclusive rights
conferred by the Federal Copyright Act of 19768 upon the
copyright owners of the original films.9 Unfortunately for
Huntsman, the District Court for the District of Colorado ruled that
all businesses that created and/or marketed such altered movies
operated in direct violation of the Copyright Act.10 The court’s
decision forced Huntsman, Lines, and many other purveyors of EFilms out of business, and enjoined all these merchants from
engaging in such proscribed activity in the future.11
The court held that producers and vendors of E-Films, which it
collectively referred to as “Mechanical Editing Parties,”12 violated
two of the exclusive rights Section 106 of the Copyright Act
provided to copyright holders: the right to reproduce a copyrighted
4

“Both the numbers of such companies and their reach have expanded in just the last
few months.” Lyman, supra note 2.
5
The Lines’ enterprise was called
CleanFlicks Media, Inc. See
http://www.cleanflicks.com (last visited Feb. 11, 2007). However, CleanFlicks appears
as two words in the federal reporter. See Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236. I have
chosen to refer to the enterprise as ‘CleanFlicks,’ except when making a direct citation to
the case name as reported.
6
See id.; Joanne Ostrow, Sanitizing Films: Directors vs. Censors, DENVER POST, Apr.
21, 2005, at F1 (“In an interview, Clean Flicks [sic] owner Ray Lines says his business
was born when several friends asked him to edit Kate Winslet’s nude scene out of their
DVD copies of Titanic. Suddenly, he found himself in the movie business.”).
7
John Accola, A Win for Movie Sanitizers: Judge Drops Two Companies from
Copyright Lawsuit, ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Denver), Aug. 19, 2005, at 2B.
8
17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2000).
9
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000) (affording lawful copyright holders certain exclusive
rights); Accola, supra note 7.
10
Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1243–44 (D. Colo.
2006).
11
Id.
12
Id. at 1237.
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work and the right to distribute a copyrighted work publicly.13
Even though the discretionary editing led to the creation of new
works that are fundamentally different in nature and character from
the original films, the court nevertheless determined that the EFilms were not “transformative”14 and thus did not constitute
derivative works based on the original copyrighted work.15
Though the Mechanical Editing Parties asserted defenses premised
on both fair use and the first sale doctrine,16 the court astutely
rejected both of these lines of reasoning,17 neither of which was
applicable to the actions of the Mechanical Editing Parties.
Part I of this Comment outlines the relevant case law and
doctrine, including the various provisions of the Copyright Act of
1976,18 as well as the case law that defines and demarcates
copyright infringement and the boundaries of fair use. Part II
examines the Clean Flicks decision and the court’s reasoning
behind its finding of copyright infringement. Part III argues that
the court’s holding was flawed because the secondary works
CleanFlicks created constitute derivative works, and analyzes the
court’s erroneous application of the fair use test. Part IV concludes
that robust enforcement of valid copyrights in artistic works is
particularly important in a society that does not recognize the
doctrine of moral rights in justifying copyright protection.

13

17 U.S.C. § 106 (1), (3) (2000); Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1243.
Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1241.
15
Id. at 1242.
16
Id. at 1239, 1242. Section 109 of the Copyright Act codifies the first sale doctrine,
essentially removing the copyright holder’s right of control over an authorized work once
that work enters into the stream of commerce. See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2000); Quality King
Distrib., Inc. v. L’Anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 152 (1998). The first sale
doctrine does not operate to relinquish the copyright holder’s control of the copyright
itself. See Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir.
1988) (holding that the first sale doctrine does not relinquish a copyright holder’s
exclusive right to prepare derivative works).
17
Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1242.
18
17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2000).
14
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I. RELEVANT CASE LAW AND DOCTRINE
A. Copyright Infringement, 17 U.S.C. § 106
Section 106 of the federal Copyright Act of 1976 grants owners
of copyrighted works certain exclusive rights, and precludes others
from engaging in specific activities without express authorization
from the copyright owner.19 The statute reads, in pertinent part:
“the owner of copyright . . . has the exclusive rights . . . (1) to
reproduce the copyrighted work . . . ; (2) to prepare derivative
works based upon the copyrighted work; [and] (3) to distribute
copies . . . of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.”20 In the
absence of express authorization, if a plaintiff can prove valid
ownership of a copyright, and that the putative defendant copied,
in any form enumerated in § 106, original elements of the work to
which this copyright applies, courts will deem the defendant an
infringer.21 Courts often rely on circumstantial evidence to prove
copying,22 but many cases involve direct appropriation of a
copyrighted work.23
19

17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
Id.
21
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (citing Harper &
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 548 (1985)). The Court in Feist
traced the originality requirement from its inception in The Trade-Mark Cases through to
cases decided after the Copyright Act of 1976 became law. Id. at 345–58. In order to
qualify for copyright protection, works of independent creation must contain a “modicum
of creativity,” id. at 346 (citing The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879), as
copyright law does not reward merely the “sweat of the brow,” id. at 359–60. For a good
discussion of the elements of direct copyright infringement, see Melanie Costantino,
Note, Fairly Used: Why Google’s Book Project Should Prevail under the Fair Use
Defense, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 235, 247–50 (2006).
22
Courts will look to see if there has been access and if the works are substantially
similar. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946). Substantial similarity
is not the same as probative similarity, which looks to the amount of copied material;
substantial similarity instead focuses on the quality of the copied material and how
integral to the original work it is. See generally Johnson v. Gordon, 409 F.3d 12, 18 (1st
Cir. 2005).
23
Compare Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1243 (D.
Colo. 2006) (holding that the use of whole copyrighted films in creating edited versions
of those films is direct infringement), with Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs
Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177, 180–81 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding that George Harrison’s
20
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B. The Doctrine of Fair Use, 17 U.S.C. § 107
The affirmative defense of fair use, while long-standing,
existed as an exclusively judge-made doctrine until its codification
in § 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976.24 A determination of fair
use essentially excuses an allegedly infringing work from liability
for infringement, as its benefit to the progress in the sciences and
arts outweighs the detriment its existence causes.25 Under the
statute, courts weigh the following four factors when making
determinations of whether the secondary use is fair:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work.26
If the balance of the four factors weighs in favor of the
secondary work as opposed to the original, copyrighted work, the
secondary work meets the statutory threshold, and judges will

song “My Sweet Lord” misappropriated the chord progressions of another hit song,
Robert Mack’s “He’s So Fine”), aff’d, 772 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983).
24
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994). Justice Story
articulated the governing formulation for determining whether an infringer was making
“fair use” of a copyrighted work in 1841: “look to the nature and objects of the selections
made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may
prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work.”
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (No. 4901) (D. Mass. 1841). In Campbell, Justice
Souter traces Congress’ intent in drafting of Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976,
which transformed the judge-made doctrine of fair use into statutory law through
codification. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 576–78.
25
See Bill Graham Archives v. Doring Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 608 (2d Cir.
2006) (citing Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, 150 F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir.
1998)).
26
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
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sanction the continued manufacture of the secondary work without
liability.27
In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, the Supreme Court considered the
doctrine of fair use in the context of parodies.28 Campbell
involved the rap group 2 Live Crew’s parodic use of Roy
Orbison’s classic song, “Oh, Pretty Woman,” the copyright to
which Acuff-Rose held.29 The 2 Live Crew version of the song
utilized the same basic structure and many of the same lyrics, but
also offered what the Court saw as “a comment on the naiveté of
the original of an earlier day . . . a rejection of its sentiment that
ignores the ugliness of street life and the debasement that it
signifies.”30 The Court noted that both the first factor, the
“purpose and character of the use” factor, and the second factor,
the “nature of the copyrighted work,” weighed in favor of AcuffRose, as the 2 Live Crew song was purely commercial in nature
and Orbison’s original creative expression fell at the heart of what
copyright seeks to protect.31
The third factor, which explores “the amount and substantiality
of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole,”32 weighed in favor of neither the parodists nor the
copyright holders.33 The Court acknowledged that the parodists
took a substantial amount of the original work, but recognized that
parody requires a “recognizable allusion” to an original work.34
The Court relied most heavily, however, on the fourth statutory
factor, the “effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work,”35 and remanded the case for a

27

See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578; see also Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990)
(“‘[C]ourts [should] avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it
would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.’” (quoting Iowa State
Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980))).
28
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 571–72.
29
Id. at 572–73.
30
Id. at 583.
31
Id. at 578–86.
32
17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2000).
33
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 589. The Court remanded the case to determine, in light of 2
Live Crew’s parodic purpose, whether 2 Live Crew took more than was necessary. Id.
34
Id. at 587–88.
35
17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000).
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determination of the economic impact on the potential “rap music”
market for derivative works based on Orbison’s song.36
The Court determined that although a parody might be
commercial in nature, might infringe on creative expression, such
as a song, that is “closer to the core of intended copyright
protection than other [works],”37 and might make use of a
substantial portion of the copyrighted work, as long as the use is
clearly parodic, an infringing party is justified in making such “fair
use” of the original copyrighted work.38 The lesson learned from
Campbell is that while fair use might be defensible given the
societal value of a secondary work, the secondary work’s existence
might nevertheless cause irreparable harm to the potential market
for the original.39
The fair use defense applies to all putative violations of § 106
of the Copyright Act,40 but is more difficult to apply to derivative
works,41 given the Constitutional interest in the progress of the arts
and sciences.42 A derivative work, as defined in § 101 of the
36

See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 593–94. The Court noted that “2 Live Crew’s song
comprises not only parody but also rap music, and the derivative market for rap music is
a proper focus of enquiry.” Id. at 592–93 (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 568 (1985).
37
Id. at 586.
38
See id. at 594 (“The [C]ourt [of Appeals] erred in holding that 2 Live Crew had
necessarily copied excessively from the Orbison original, considering the parodic
purpose of the use.”).
39
See Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, 150 F. 3d 132, 145 (2d Cir.
1998) (“[T]he fair use, being transformative, might well harm, or even destroy, the
market for the original.”).
40
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
41
See, e.g., Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1362–63 (Ct. Cl.
1973), aff’d by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975). Although it was not
necessarily easy for the court to determine that the use of photocopied, copyrighted
materials by government officials was fair, the balance was limited to rights holders’
interests in copyright protection versus society’s interest in the advancement of medical
science. Id. at 1359. With a case involving straight reproduction, a court is not even
forced to comment on the quality or worth of either the original or the infringing works
themselves. In Campbell, the Court specifically notes that while it “might not assign a
high rank to the parodic element” of 2 Live Crew’s derivative work, it was still parodic in
nature and ultimately excused by a fair use defense. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583. See also
Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1240 (D. Colo. 2006)
(“This [c]ourt is not free to determine the social value of copyrighted works.”).
42
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

CLARE_FORMATTED_PROOFEDS_032107

736

3/21/2007 2:43:13 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

Vol. XVII

Copyright Act, is “a work based upon one or more preexisting
works, such as a . . . motion picture version” and is, in and of itself,
a new original work of authorship.43 Courts have interpreted this
exception as requiring that a new derivative work be
“transformative” of the copyrighted work,44 in order to truly
demonstrate progress.45 In general, however, “no part of an
infringing derivative work should be granted copyright
protection.”46
C. The ‘First Sale’ Doctrine
CleanFlicks and other Mechanical Editing Parties relied on the
“first sale doctrine” as an additional affirmative defense.47 The
first sale doctrine “protects the purchaser in any use of the
authorized copy acquired but does not permit the making of
additional copies.”48 The doctrine, codified in § 109 of the
Copyright Act, stands for the proposition that a copyright holder
cannot control the use or disposition of individual copies once
those individual copies have been sold.49 In Mirage Editions, Inc.
v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that the first sale doctrine did not protect transfer of art
from the pages of a book onto ceramic tiles, as this transfer
constituted preparation of a derivative work.50 The court held that
“the right to transfer applies only to the particular copy of the book
which . . . has [been] purchased and . . . does not transfer [the]
43

17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). “A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations,
elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of
authorship, is a derivative work.” Id.
44
See Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1241 (“This raises the question of whether these
DVD-Rs are ‘transformative.’”).
45
See Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 608 (2d Cir.
2006) (citing Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105,
1111 (1990)); see also Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (“[T]he goal of copyright, to promote
science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works.”).
46
Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87-0592 WDKGX, 1989 WL 206431, at *10 (C.D. Cal.
Apr. 25, 1989).
47
Clean Flicks, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1242.
48
Id.
49
See C.M. Paula Co. v. Logan, 355 F. Supp. 189, 191–92 (N.D. Tex. 1973) (quoting 1
MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 103.3 (1972 ed.).
50
856 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1988).
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right [to prepare derivative works].”51 The owner of a purchased
book does not control the copyright to that book, but the copyright
holder may not control how an individual copy of that book is
used, so long as the owner does not exercise any of the exclusive
rights delineated in § 106.52
II. THE CLEAN FLICKS DECISION
A. Background
The dispute started in 2002, when Robert Huntsman filed a
declaratory judgment against 16 members of the Directors Guild of
America (“DGA”),53 including Steven Soderbergh, Martin
Scorsese and Steven Spielberg,54 as a “preemptive strike.”55
Huntsman filed on behalf of businesses that produced E-Films for
family viewing, wherein editing companies, at their sole discretion,
removed “objectionable” language and images from movies
through certain technological means56 and then distributed these
51

Id.
Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 79 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5693 (“[T]he outright sale of an authorized copy of a book frees it from any
copyright control over its resale price or other conditions of its future disposition.”).
53
“[T]hrough the collective voice of more than 12,700 members that the DGA
represents, the Guild seeks to protect directorial teams’ legal and artistic rights, contend
for their creative freedom, and strengthen their ability to develop meaningful and credible
careers.” Michael Apted, DGA President, Welcome to the Directors Guild of America
Web Site, http://www.dga.org/index2.php3?chg= (last visited Jan. 27, 2007).
54
Second Amended Complaint and Jury Demand at 1–2, Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v.
Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (D. Colo. 2006) (No. 02-M-1662 (MJW)), 2002 WL
32153735, at *1.
55
See Sara Gansheimer, Comment, The Family Entertainment and Copyright Act and
Its Consequences and Implications for the Movie-Editing Industry, 8 TUL. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 173, 179 (2006); see also Nicole Griffin Farrell, Frankly, We Do Give
a . . . Darn! Hollywood’s Battle Against Unauthorized Editing of Motion Pictures: The
“CleanFlicks” Case, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1041, 1043 (2003) (stating that the DGA’s
publication of a memorandum on its website revealing its intent to file suit against
CleanFlicks and the other creators and purveyors of E-Films precipitated Huntsman’s
preemptive strike).
56
Gansheimer, supra note 55, at 175–78. The creators of E-Films employed one of
three methods to produce their sanitized movies. Id. Cut-and-splice editing, in which an
editor physically or digitally cuts out objectionable portions of a film and then reattaches
the remaining scenes, is the most straightforward of these techniques. Id. at 175–76.
52
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altered copies, by rental or sale, to retailers and video rental
outlets.
CleanFlicks, one of the E-Films producers, operated by first
obtaining an authorized copy of a movie, and digitally copying the
entire movie onto the hard drive of a computer, circumventing
protective safeguards encoded onto the DVD to prevent such
copying.57 Next, CleanFlicks digitally edited the movie, creating a
new fixed work.58 CleanFlicks redacted objectionable audio and
visual content through the use of ambient noise,59 black bars to
cover any indecencies, fogging, cropping, and “blending” of
existing content.60 CleanFlicks copied the newly edited version
onto a blank DVD-R or VHS cassette, and placed its trademarked
logo onto the case before shipping the work out for public
consumption.61
In response to the declaratory judgment, the directors
counterclaimed against Huntsman and filed a motion seeking leave
to compel joinder of several major movie studios (“the Studios”),
as the film studios, not the directors, are the rightful owners of the
copyrights in question.62 Without the Studios, the directors lacked
the requisite standing to assert counterclaims of copyright

CleanFlicks and CleanFilms favored the digital incarnation of this method, which entails
loading a DVD onto a computer, removing objectionable scenes with the aid of digital
editing software, and then burning the sanitized version onto a new DVD or VHS. Id. at
176. The second method is filtering, wherein one encodes a DVD or VHS cassette with
an instruction for a DVD player or VCR directing the player to cut out or mute a section
of the film during playback. Id. at 177. ClearPlay is a well-known purveyor of DVD
players with built-in technology allowing subscribers to go online and order filtering
instructions for a given film through ClearPlay’s proprietary subscription service. Id. The
third method is filtering-plus technology, in which editors digitally superimpose new
material—such as a corset over Kate Winslet’s originally bare breast in Titanic—in order
to sanitize objectionable scenes. Id.
57
Clean Flicks, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1238.
58
Id.
59
In a scene that takes place on a city street, for example, the editors at CleanFlicks
might have used the sound of a car horn to cover up an uttered expletive.
60
Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1238.
61
Id.
62
Id. (“The Studios, in the aggregate, have valid copyrights for the motion pictures . . .
identified by name in the filed papers and, therefore, have the exclusive rights grated by
§ 106 of the [Copyright] Act.”); see also Farrell, supra note 55, at 1043–44.
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infringement.63 The directors also moved to join 13 other parties,64
and the DGA filed a motion for leave to intervene.65 The court
granted all these motions on October 15, 2002,66 while the Studios
lodged their counterclaim on December 13, 2002.67
The
Mechanical Editing Parties relied on the doctrines of fair use and
“first sale” to defend their alleged infringement upon the Studios’
copyrights.68
In 2005, before any decision regarding the legality of
CleanFlicks’ activities, Congress, as a component of the Family
Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005,69 enacted the Family
Movie Act of 2005, which sanctions the use of filtering technology
for in-home family viewing.70 The Family Movie Act creates an
exemption for skipping audio-visual content of a motion picture so
long as “no fixed copy of the altered version of the motion picture
is created by [a] computer program or other technology.”71 The
63

Farrell, supra note 55, at 1045 (“Regardless of the particular editing methodologies,
the original plaintiffs may not have had standing if the motion-picture studios had not
been joined as necessary parties.”).
64
Id. at 1043–44 (citing Defendants’ Motion to Compel Joinder of Third-Party
Copyright Holders as Necessary Parties at 2, Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (No. 02M-1662 (MJW))).
65
Id. at 1044 (citing Defendants’ Motion for Leave to Join Third Parties as
Counterdefendants at 1–2, Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (No. 02-M-1662 (MJW));
Amended Counterclaim at 6–9, Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (No. 02-M-1662
(MJW)); DGA’s Motion for Leave to Intervene at 3, Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236
(No. 02-M-1662 (MJW))).
66
Id. (citing Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Compel Joinder of Third-Party
Copyright Holders as Necessary Parties at 1, Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (No. 02M-1662 (MJW)); Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for Leave to Join Third Parties as
Counterdefendants at 1, Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (No. 02-M-1662 (MJW));
Order Granting DGA’s Motion for Leave to Intervene at 1, Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d
1236 (No. 02-M-1662 (MJW))).
67
Motion Picture Studio Defendants’ Answer and Counterclaims at 1, Clean Flicks,
433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (No. 02-M-1662 (MJW)), 2002 WL 32153736, at *1.
68
Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1239, 1242; Farrell, supra note 55, at 1065.
69
Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9, 119 Stat. 218
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.A., 15 U.S.C.A., 17 U.S.C.A., 18
U.S.C.A., 28 U.S.C.A. and 36 U.S.C.A. (West 2007)).
70
Family Movie Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9, sec. 201–202, §§ 110, 1114, 119 Stat.
218, 223–24 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114 and 17 U.S.C.A. § 110 (West
2007)).
71
Id. at sec. 202, § 110, 119 Stat. at 223 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.A. § 110
(West 2007)).
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court removed the parties that only provided enabling filtering
technology, namely ClearPlay and Family Shield, from the suit
consequent to the passage of this Act.72 Those entities that
engaged in cut-and-splice editing, and the retailers that sold or
rented films edited in such a manner directly to the public,
however, remained subject to the outcome of the litigation.73
The remaining parties in the directors’ counterclaim included
CleanFlicks, Family Flix, Play It Clean Video, and CleanFilms.74
Family Flix operated in much the same way as CleanFlicks, by
copying an authorized version of a movie onto a computer, and
subsequently editing the film to “delete ‘profanity, nudity, strong
graphic violence and sexual content or innuendos.’”75 Family Flix
sold the new version of the movie, along with its disabled original
version, in the original packaging with the Family Flix
trademark.76
CleanFilms and Play It Clean rented and sold the films
obtained from CleanFlicks and Family Flix directly to the public.77
While CleanFilms maintained a one-to-one ratio of unedited to
edited versions of the films it sold or rented, Play It Clean never
maintained such an inventory, and relied on its suppliers’ promises
that for every edited version sold to them, their suppliers had
purchased an unedited version.78
In July 2006, the court ruled on the Studios’ motion for partial
summary judgment against the collective Mechanical Editing
Parties.79 The Studios sought to enjoin all four of these entities
from editing or distributing edited versions of their copyrighted
works violative of § 106 of the Federal Copyright Act of 1976.80
The Studios asserted that CleanFlicks and Family Flix violated
72
Huntsman v. Soderbergh, No. Civ.A02CV01662RPMMJW, 2005 WL 1993421, at
*2 (D. Colo. Aug 17, 2005); Gansheimer, supra note 55, at 179–80.
73
Gansheimer, supra note 55, at 179.
74
Id.
75
Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1238 (D. Colo.
2006).
76
Id.
77
Id. at 1238–39.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 1237.
80
Id. at 1238.
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their exclusive rights to reproduce their copyrighted works,81 make
derivative works82 based on their copyrighted films,83 and
distribute copies of their copyrighted films.84
B. The Court’s Holding
In July, 2006, the United States District Court for the District
of Colorado, with Senior District Judge Richard Matsch presiding,
put an end to the three-year battle.85 The court ultimately ruled
that the Mechanical Editing Parties stood in violation of two
provisions of § 106 of the Federal Copyright Act of 1976,86 and
that injunctive relief was the proper remedy for their infractions.87
The court agreed with the Studios that the Mechanical Editing
Parties violated § 106(1) of the Copyright Act when they created
fixed copies of the Studios’ copyrighted works.88 Additionally, the
court held that the Mechanical Editing Parties were liable for
copyright infringement based on their “undisputed . . .
distribut[ion], by sale and rental, [of] copies (albeit edited) of the
Studios’ copyrighted works . . . .”89 The court, however, did not
find that the Mechanical Editing Parties infringed on the Studios’
rights under § 106(2),90 namely, the exclusive right to create
derivative works.91 The court also held that the affirmative
defenses of fair use and the first sale doctrine that the Mechanical
Editing Parties raised were not persuasive.92 Ultimately, the court

81

17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2000).
17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000).
83
Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1239.
84
Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2000)).
85
Amelia Nielson-Stowell, CleanFlicks Plans to Appeal Ruling, DESERET MORNING
NEWS (Salt Lake City), July 9, 2006, at A1.
86
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000); Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1243.
87
Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d. at 1243–44.
88
Id. at 1239 (“The reproduction complained of is the making of . . . copies of copies,
for which their ‘one-to-one ratio’ of edited to original version argument does not preclude
a finding of infringement.”).
89
Id.
90
Id. at 1242 (“[B]ecause the infringing copies of these movies are not used in a
transformative manner, they are not derivative works and do not violate § 106(2).”).
91
17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000).
92
Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1242. The court summarily dismissed the first sale
doctrine defense as having no relevance to the case based on the Studios’ assertions. Id.
82
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ruled that it could not deny the copyright holders’ legal right to
control the reproduction and distribution of their protected works,
even if its decision effectively eviscerated the Mechanical Editing
Parties’ businesses.93
C. Court Denies CleanFlicks’s Fair Use Defense
Once it determined that the newly edited works infringed upon
only two of the exclusive rights § 106 affords to lawful copyright
holders, the court turned its attention to an analysis of whether fair
use was a viable defense to all allegations of infringement.94 In so
doing, the court concluded that the edited versions of the
copyrighted works were not transformative, and therefore not
derivative works as defined by § 101 of the Copyright Act.95 The
court reasoned that because the Mechanical Editing Parties
“add[ed] nothing new to these movies,” but rather only “delete[ed]
scenes and dialogue from them,” they did not violate § 106(2) of
the Copyright Act.96 This determination in turn led to the court’s
conclusion that fair use was not a viable defense in the case at
hand.97
The court conducted a factor-by-factor analysis of the fair use
defense, starting with the first factor, which contemplates the
purpose and character of a use.98 The court noted that the basis for
the Mechanical Editing Parties’ assertion of fair use is criticism,99
an example of fair use that the statutory codification specifically
enumerates.100 The Mechanical Editing Parties relied on Chicago

at 1242. The court also rejected the affirmative defenses of waiver, estoppel and laches as
the facts of the case did not support these defenses. Id.
93
Id. at 1243.
94
Id. at 1239.
95
Id. at 1239–41.
96
Id. at 1241.
97
Id. (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)).
98
Id. at 1240.
99
Id.
100
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (listing “criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research” as activities that
are non-infringing). Note that Congress did not intend this to be a closed list. Campbell,
510 U.S. at 577 (“The text employs the terms ‘including’ and ‘such as’ in the preamble
paragraph to indicate the ‘illustrative and not limitative’ function of the examples
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Board of Educ. v. Substance, Inc.101 to support their contention that
criticism of the Studios’ films supported a claim of fair use.102 The
court, in response, pointed out the irony of citing a case that
specifically noted that indiscriminate publishing for the purpose of
criticism was just as inexcusable as the destruction of fine art by an
unappreciative viewer.103 The court concluded that it was not free
to evaluate the social worth of the Studios’ copyrighted works.104
Therefore, the court held that the defendants’ reliance on
Substance was inapposite, and the Mechanical Editing Parties
could not cloak their behavior under the veil of criticism.105
With respect to the second fair use factor, the court stated that
because the secondary works were not transformative, the purpose
and character of use factor did not support the Mechanical Editing
Parties’ fair use defense.106 Certain courts and commentators have
asserted that this second factor is the most important in a
determination of fair use,107 so it would seem that the fair use
defense would likely fail if the secondary work was not
transformative,108 particularly since a transformative work is more
likely to further the progress of the arts and sciences contemplated
by the Copyright Clause.109 The court further determined that
given.”) (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561
(1985)).
101
354 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that a teacher is entitled to criticize questions
contained in standardized tests, even if that criticism might require substantial quotation).
102
Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1240.
103
Substance, 354 F.3d at 630 (“[The teacher] does not have the right . . . to destroy the
tests by publishing them indiscriminately, any more than a person who dislikes
Michelangelo’s statue of David has a right to take a sledgehammer to it.”). Judge Posner
also notes that “[i]t is not a privilege to criticize just bad works, and there is no right to
copy copyrighted works promiscuously merely upon a showing that they are bad.” Id.
104
Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1240.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 1241 (“There is nothing transformative about the edited copies.”).
107
See Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 608 (2d Cir.
2006) (citing Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105,
1111 (1990)).
108
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
109
Additionally, the more transformative the secondary use, the less likely it is that the
new work serves as a substitute for the original. See Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol
Publ’g Group, 150 F.3d 132, 145 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Campbell v. Acuff Rose Music,
Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994) (noting that when a secondary work is transformative,
“market substitution is at least less certain, and market harm may not be so readily
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consideration of the third factor, “the quantitative and qualitative
nature of the copyrighted material taken,” weighed heavily against
a determination of fair use, because the Mechanical Editing Parties
copied the original works in near entirety with no
transformation.110
The court devoted most of its discussion to the fourth statutory
factor, which focuses on the potential economic harm that a
secondary work might inflict on the owner of the copyrighted work
with respect to both the original work and any potential derivative
works.111 This third factor is widely considered the most important
in a fair use analysis.112 The Mechanical Editing Parties asserted
that in creating their clean versions, they were expanding the
market for the Studios’ films to include consumers who would
otherwise not view the films because of the indecencies contained
therein.113 The Court noted that while this argument contained
“superficial appeal,”114 it was fundamentally misguided.115
According to the court: “the intrinsic value of the right to control
the content of the copyrighted work . . . is the essence of the law of
copyright.”116 Consequently, the court determined that the right to
exclude certain audiences from reach was a right held exclusively
by the Studios.117
After rejecting the Mechanical Editing Parties’ affirmative
defenses, the court held that the Studios deserved the requested

inferred”); Costantino, supra note 21, at 269 (“The more the allegedly infringing work is
transformed from the original, the less the commercialism prong of the section 107(1) test
will matter.”) (citing Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003)).
110
Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1241. The court explains that the second factor
weighs heavily in favor of the Studios based on the non-transformative nature of the
secondary works coupled with the creative expression of the copyrighted films
themselves. Id. The third factor, the amount used, also weighs heavily in favor of the
Studios based on the pilfering of the films in their entirety. Id.
111
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). See also Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590; Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 568 (1985).
112
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 574 (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566); Costantino,
supra note 21, at 257.
113
Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1241–42.
114
Id. at 1242.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
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injunctive relief.118 In response to the requested injunction, the
Mechanical Editing Parties retorted that such an equitable remedy
would effectively “destroy their businesses and deprive the public
of the benefit of seeing these movies without offending their
sensibilities to the deleted material.”119 The Mechanical Editing
Parties relied on the Court of Claims’ decision in Williams &
Wilkins Co. v. United States.120
That case involved the
unauthorized photocopying of materials by government employees
in their efforts to further medical science and research.121 The
Court of Claims held that the detriment it would inflict upon
society if it enjoined such activity outweighed the harm the
copyright owners encountered to such an extent that the
photocopying constituted fair use.122 The court in Clean Flicks,
however, distinguished the entertainment value of films from the
societal value of the advancement of medical science and, finding
no equation, determined that the public interest in providing
injunctive relief for the Studios was sound.123
D. The Court Denies the ‘First Sale’ Defense
The court properly determined that the first sale doctrine was
of no relevance to the case at bar.124 As Judge Matsch noted, while
the first sale doctrine protects an owner’s use of an authorized
version of a copyrighted work, it does not allow the purchaser to
make additional copies of the copyrighted work.125 The Studios,
however, were not complaining about the use of the lawfully
acquired copies of their films; they were seeking to enjoin the
Mechanical Editing Parties from using a lawfully acquired copy in
“making edits and creating the copies that are distributed to the
118

Id. at 1238. The Copyright Act allows for reasonable temporary or permanent
injunctive relief. 17 U.S.C. § 502 (2000).
119
Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1242.
120
487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff’d by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
121
Id. at 1346–47.
122
See Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1243 (outlining the factual distinction between
the case at bar and the Williams & Wilkins case).
123
Id. (referring to the Mechanical Editing Parties business as “illegitimate”). The court
further ordered the Mechanical Editing Parties to turn over their entire inventories of any
infringing works to the Studios. Id. at 1244.
124
Id. at 1242.
125
Id.
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public.”126 Therefore, the first sale doctrine did not excuse the
infringing behavior.127
III. WHY THE COURT ERRED IN ITS RULING
The court correctly determined that the Mechanical Editing
Parties infringed the exclusive right of a copyright holder to
reproduce the work in copies. Section 106(1) of the Copyright Act
of 1976 establishes a straightforward exclusive right; the only
requirements for infringement are a valid copyright, that the
copyrighted work is reproduced in whole or substantial part, that
the expression and not the underlying ideas are copied, and that the
copy itself be fixed, that is, sufficiently stable to be perceived.128
In the instant case, the Mechanical Editing Parties had reproduced
copyrighted works in whole and created fixed, edited master copies
in order to provide consumers with additional copies of their edited
films.129 The court was unmoved by the Mechanical Editing
Parties’ insistence that their method of purchasing one authorized
film for every edited version they sold legitimized their practice,
and correctly ruled that the Mechanical Editing Parties had
violated § 106(1).130
Likewise, the court was correct in holding that the Mechanical
Editing Parties violated § 106(3), or the exclusive right to
distribute a copyrighted work publicly. The court pronounced that
it was “undisputed” that the Mechanical Editing Parties were
engaging in the distribution or public sale of edited copies of the
copyrighted works.131 Absent a valid defense, the Mechanical
Editing Parties violated this exclusive right of the copyright
holders.132 The only possible defense to the exclusive right of
126

Id.
Id.
128
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 61 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5674–75.
129
Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1239 (“The reproduction complained of is the
making by Clean Flicks and Family Flix of voluminous fixed copies of the edited master
versions of the Studios’ movies, i.e., copies of copies.”).
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
127
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distribution is the first sale doctrine, codified in § 109 of the
Copyright Act.133 A copyright holder cannot maintain control over
each physical copy of a copyrighted work once it has sold such a
work, which enables, for example, the resale of used music
compact discs.134 If however the first sale doctrine is inapplicable,
as it is in this case, no justification for engaging in such behavior
exists.135 Accordingly, the court ruled that the Mechanical Editing
Parties violated the Studios’ right to exclusive distribution.136
The court erred in holding that the secondary works the
Mechanical Editing Parties produced were not derivative. In its
decision, the court relied on Campbell, stating that the “Supreme
Court said that a use is transformative if it ‘adds something new,
with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with
new expression, meaning or message.’”137 Yet the Mechanical
Editing Parties did just that in their creation of their secondary
works.138 Through altering the content of the films to appeal to a
different audience than the filmmakers and studios originally
intended to reach, the Mechanical Editing Parties created new
works of authorship that embody wholly different meanings and
contain wholly different messages.139 By their own admission, the
133

See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 62, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5676
(“As section 109 [of the Copyright Act] makes clear . . . the copyright owner’s rights [to
exclusive public distribution] under section 106(3) cease with respect to a particular
copy . . . once he has parted with ownership of it.”).
134
See, e.g., U2 Home Entm’t, Inc. v. Lai Ying Music and Video Trading, Inc., No. 04
Civ.1233(DLC), 2005 WL 1231645, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2005).
135
Id. (“Th[e] right of an acquirer to resell copies is limited, however, to his possession
of authorized copies. . . . [T]he owner of copies of a work may resell or otherwise dispose
of those copies without seeking permission from the copyright owner only so long as the
copies were ‘lawfully made . . . .’”).
136
“Read literally, § 109(a) unambiguously states that such an owner ‘is entitled,
without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell’ that item.” Quality King
Distributors, Inc. v. L’Anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 145 (1998).
137
Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1241 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)).
138
See Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 143 (2d Cir.
1998) (“A secondary work need not necessarily transform the original work’s expression
to have a transformative purpose.” (citing 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[D][2] (1997 ed.))).
139
Taken to its logical extreme, sanctioning this type of behavior could have severely
detrimental effects. If the court deemed the Mechanical Editing Parties’ actions
permissible, for example, the Mechanical Editing Parties “could create and sell versions
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Mechanical Editing Parties were seeking to “send a strong message
that many people object to the type of movies being created by the
Studios.”140 It is therefore erroneous to conclude that these
secondary works were not transformative.
Furthermore, the secondary works satisfy the statutory
definition of a derivative work.141 Section 101 of the federal
Copyright Act states that a work is derivative if it consists of
“editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other
modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of
authorship.”142 In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Service Co., the Supreme Court imposed a low threshold for
originality, requiring only that a work be “independently created
by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it
possess[] at least some minimal degree of creativity” in order to be
original.143 Even if one construes the Mechanical Editing Parties’
actions as nothing more than cut-and-splice editing, the
Mechanical Editing Parties still engaged in discretionary editorial
revisions and created new works of authorship.144 The secondary
works they produced are therefore derivative.
of the Studios’ Motion Pictures that removed characters of certain ethnic types or of a
certain race because some consumers preferred their films that way.” Motion Picture
Studios’ Reply Brief in Further Support of Their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Against the Mechanical Editing Parties at 4, Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (No. 02M-1662 (MJW), 2002 CO App. Ct. Motions LEXIS 46, at *12.
140
Counterclaim Defendant CleanFlicks LLC’s Opposition to the Motion Picture
Studios’ Opening Brief in Support of Their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Against the Mechanical Editing Parties at 8, Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (No. 02M-1662 (MJW), 2005 CO App. Ct. Motions LEXIS 19680, at *12 [hereinafter
CleanFlicks Opposition to Motion]. Certainly a stronger message could be sent by not
purchasing the offensive films at all.
141
See, e.g., Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341, 1343 (9th
Cir. 1988) (“The protection of derivative rights extends beyond mere protection against
unauthorized copying to include the right to make other version of, perform, or exhibit
the work.” (citing Lone Ranger Television v. Program Radio Corp., 740 F.2d 718, 722
(9th Cir. 1984); Russell v. Price, 612 F.2d 1123, 1128 n.16 (9th Cir. 1979))).
142
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
143
499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (citing 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01[A]–[B] (1990 ed.)).
144
The Mechanical Editing Parties certainly engage in discretionary editing, removing
the parts of films that they find offensive or indecent. See also Mirage Editions, 856 F.2d
at 1344 (holding that the transfer of pages of an art book onto ceramic tiles was the
creation of a new work of authorship).
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The failure of the fair use defense in the instant case thus
hinges on the transformative nature of the Mechanical Editing
Parties’ works, rather than on their pilfering of substantial portions
of the original work, or on the fact that the works they altered lay
at the heart of that which copyright seeks to protect. The fair use
defense fails here primarily because the resultant economic harm
to the potential market for this kind of derivative work is
substantial.145 In MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit used a sliding scale approach to determine whether
use is truly fair in the face of such potential economic harm.146
The court stated that “the less adverse effect that an alleged
infringing use has on the copyright owner’s expectation of gain,
the less public benefit need be shown to justify the use.”147 In the
instant case, the effect on the potential market for such derivative
works was substantial; the Mechanical Editing Parties were
essentially foreclosing the Studios from selling edited versions of
their own films to a large audience in which little notable
competition existed.148 It is only necessary to inquire into
potential economic harm,149 so the fact that the Studios did not
demonstrate an interest in appealing to such an audience is not
dispositive.150
145

Gansheimer, supra note 55, at 185 (“The studios could lose out on profits for selling
the more expensive . . . edited versions of their movies.”); see also Sega Enters. v.
MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 935 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (noting that the fourth statutory factor
is the most important).
146
677 F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 1981).
147
Id.
148
Gansheimer, supra note 55, at 185; accord Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g
Group, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 260, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“It would . . . not serve the ends of
the Copyright Act—i.e., to advance the arts—if artists were denied their monopoly over
derivative versions of their creative works merely because they made the artistic decision
not to saturate those markets with variations of their original.”), quoted with approval in
Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, 150 F.3d 132, 146 (2d Cir. 1998).
149
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (“The fourth fair
use factor . . . . requires courts to consider not only the extent of the market harm caused
by the particular actions of the alleged infringer, but also ‘whether unrestricted and
widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant . . . would result in a
substantially adverse impact on the potential market’ for the original.” (quoting 3
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A][4] (1993
ed.)) (emphasis added)).
150
But see id. at 592 (“The market for potential derivative uses includes only those that
creators of original works would in general develop or license others to develop.”). The
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The Mechanical Editing Parties, moreover, did not seek to
supersede the Studios’ films.151 As they stated in their response to
the Studios’ motion for summary judgment, the Mechanical
Editing parties provide “an alternate viewing experience” which
both criticizes the Studios’ films and provides a transformation “in
both character and purpose from their original version.”152 By
creating these transformative, derivative works, the Mechanical
Editing Parties sought to capitalize on an untapped market for such
clean versions, thus violating both the letter and the spirit of the
law.153
IV. CONCLUSION
The decision delivered by the United States District Court for
the District of Colorado in the Clean Flicks case is a milestone in
the history of copyright protection. More and more, with the rise
of digital capabilities,154 courts must be responsible for protecting
the exclusive rights held by copyright owners. Without strict
enforcement of the statutory protections the Copyright Act offers,
advancements in technological capability will swallow all the
rights valid copyright owners hold. Accordingly, the court’s
decision to enjoin the Mechanical Editing Parties’ actions was both
correct and judicious, although its determination that the secondary
works the Mechanical Editing Parties created were not derivative

mere fact that the Studios have not yet licensed such edited versions of their works does
not mean that it is beyond the realm of possibility that they might. Take for example the
edited versions the Studios produce for in-flight entertainment on major airlines.
151
The Mechanical Editing Parties, by their own admission, create edited works, the
“transformative impact” of which is that the “entire character of a film is changed from
one that is unacceptable to many viewers to one those same viewers are more than
willing to share with their families.” Counterclaim Defendant CleanFilm Inc.’s Response
Brief to Defendant Motion Picture Studios’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 1,
Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (D. Colo. 2006) (No.
02-M-1662 (MJW), 2005 CO App. Ct. Motions LEXIS 45, at *9.
152
Id. at 6, 2005 CO App. Ct. Motions LEXIS 45, at *16.
153
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
154
When coupled with a concomitant rise in so-called “family values,” individuals and
entities can harness these technological advancements to further the dangerous goals of
censorship.
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was doctrinally unsound and inconsistent with the goals of federal
copyright protection.
In the absence of moral rights protections for artists in the
United States,155 it is crucial that judges and legislators provide the
utmost protection against copyright infringement, particularly that
which seeks to alter—and in so doing make more “palatable” to
“decent” members of society—the nature of a creative expression
and profit from that alteration. The court did not consider a First
Amendment justification for the actions of the Mechanical Editing
Parties, and for good reason: it is not appropriate to impose one’s
own tastes and preferences upon a legally protected work.156 The
issue in the Clean Flicks case was, at its core, one of taking
creative expression and turning it into a profitable enterprise at the
expense of artistic vision. The court acted appropriately in
enjoining the illegitimate activity.
Judge Matsch was wise to steer clear of passing judgment on
the artistic merits of the copyrighted works. To quote Justice
Holmes, “it would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained
only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of
[a work], outside the narrowest and most obvious limits.”157 While
some people may not like what Hollywood has to say, they do not
have the option of censorship, even in the name of criticism. It is
simply not legally cognizable to invoke the protection of our
children from the indecencies of society,158 as depicted in
Hollywood movies, as a justification for reaping economic gain off
of those same reviled films. There is no inherent right to the
enjoyment of censored versions of artistic expression, and if the
artist himself does not want to compromise his vision, copyright
law should vigorously support him.
155

See Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 25–26 (2d Cir. 1976) (“American
copyright law, as presently written, does not recognize moral rights or provide a cause of
action for their violation, since the law seeks to vindicate the economic, rather than the
personal, rights of authors.”).
156
See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
157
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 582 (1994) (quoting Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903)).
158
CleanFlicks Opposition to Motion, supra note 140, at 7–8, 2005 CO App. Ct.
Motions LEXIS 19680, at *12 (noting that a major policy issue is the concern for our
children and the effects of their seeing violence in films).

